

The University of Hong Kong

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Department of Politics and Public Administration

Presents

Policy Rents, Promotion, and China's Economic Policymaking: An Integrated Theoretical Framework

How different is the logic of special interest politics in China's economic policymaking? The understanding of this question in the literature has substantially moved from the totalitarian paradigm to the fragmented authoritarianism approach since 1990s when agency problems in China's bureaucracy were gradually exposed to the outside world. As the literature on the Chinese politics keeps marching towards a more pluralist paradigm, this talk, by contrast, attempts to roll back this trend and gives the political hierarchy the analytical weight it is due. Bringing the hierarchy back into our intellectual horizon is justified by its dynamic effect on Chinese bureaucrats' policy preferences. That is, given the institutional feature of reciprocal accountability in China's political system, the policy preferences of China's bureaucrats, who are potential lobbies for special interests, can also be synchronized with those of policy-makers when they are provided with promotion opportunities. However, for the hierarchy to be an effective political support generating mechanism, policymakers' ability to credibly commit to their promotion promises ex ante becomes pivotal. This talk provides a theoretical analysis for integrating policy rents, promotion and China's economic policy-making in a single framework.

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Date: November 5, 2013 (Tuesday)

Time: 4:30 pm

Venue: Room 9.66, The Jockey Club Tower

(Tea & coffee will be served at 4:15 pm)

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